Almost 2/3 of the Muslims in the world today live in Asia. If one were to include the number of Muslims living in Arabic, Persian and Turkish speaking nations of the Middle East as part of the total number of Muslims in Asia, the percentage would be much higher. This paper does not directly treat Middle Eastern countries but considers only the countries of South Asia, Central Asia and Southeast Asia. Even so, Indonesia has the largest Muslim population of any single nation in the world, and over half the Muslims in the world live in one of four Asian countries: Indonesia, Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh. By contrast, even though many people consider Islam to be mainly an Arab religion, less than 20% of the Muslims in the world live in Arabic-speaking countries.

Christian Muslim relations in Asia are complicated by many contrasting, and often contradictory, elements. Demographic, political, economic, social and ethnic factors affect the ways in which Christians and Muslims relate, in both positive and negative ways. Imbalances in relationships of power can be a particular source of tension and even conflict. The group that lacks power feels vulnerable and at the mercy of the good will of those in positions of power.

One of the most obvious imbalances is that of demography. In Asia, Christians and Muslims relate in a variety of majority-minority relations.

1) Muslim majority, Christian minority (Pakistan, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Brunei, Central Asian republics)
2) Christian majority, Muslim minority (Philippines)
3) Both minorities (India, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Burma, Singapore, China)
4) No clear majority (Malaysia).

Ethnic factors can play an important role in Christian-Muslim relations, particularly when one group identifies their Islamic or Christian faith as part of their ethnic identity. Malays throughout Southeast Asia, or Maranao, Maguindanao and Tausug peoples of the Philippines, often see Islam as part of what makes one belong to those ethnic groups; while Taglog, Cebuano, and Ilongo peoples of the Philippines, or Florinese and Timorese peoples of Indonesia, consider themselves Christian peoples. In those instances where the same ethnic group includes both Muslims, and Protestant and Catholic Christians, relations are generally easier. Examples of this would be Batak or Javanese people of Indonesia, or the Subanon in the Philippines.

In some places, such as in Pakistan, remnants of caste mentality can create problems for the Christian minority. Evidence that it is power relationships in the political, economic and social fields that underlie many of the tensions that sometimes arise between Christians and Muslims is the fact that, wherever both communities are minorities in a region dominated, by a third dominant group, relations between Muslims and Christians are always without problem, always at least correct, and often cordial. This would be the case of the beleaguered Christian and Muslim communities in Hindu India, in Buddhist Sri Lanka, Myanmar, and Thailand, or in Confucian Singapore. In some cases, the common experience of marginalization, and occasionally of persecution, brings the two communities together (as in Myanmar, India, and Communist China).

Traditionally, Islam in Asia has had a pietist, interior, family orientation. This is largely the result of the early preachers of Islam, who were strongly influenced by a mystical Sufi interpretation of the religion. However, in more recent times, an aggressive, militant form of Islam has emerged with which Christians find relations more tense. Militant Muslims are everywhere a small but articulate minority among Muslims; and their societal and religious programs are not shared by the majority of Muslims in Asia. To understand militant Islam in Asia today, one must recognize both the distant and proximate roots of this militant understanding of Islam.

One must remember that in Asia, Islam has a very long history, going back almost to the birth of the religion in the first century after the death of Muhammad. One might divide this history into four general periods of unequal length. As the Islamic presence in Asia developed from one period to the next, one can discover the particular characteristics of Islam in Asia that laid the bases for distant and proximate roots of Islamic revival in the region.

1. 8-13th centuries—Foreign commercial presence
2. 13-16h centuries—Age of Expansion, first Muslim states, sultanates
3. 16-20th centuries—Colonial Period
4. 1945-2002—Independent modern national states.

Muslims arrived in Asia in the first century after the death of Muhammad. In some cases, it was Arab armies who brought Islamic rule through military conquest. This was the case among the Turkic peoples of Central Asia, in Sind in Pakistan, and later on, generally in the northern part of the Indian subcontinent. More often, Islam was introduced to Asia peacefully by Arab and Persian merchants. Following established pre-Islamic commercial routes, these traders set up foreign merchant communities of Muslims in the port cities of the Indian Ocean, and along the famous "Silk Road" between China and the Mediterranean.

Because the sea voyage in the Indian Ocean and the land trip across the Silk Road took between 11/2_2 years, Muslim firms set up local offices to handle affairs. Some Muslims married local women and raised families, who were expected to adopt the Islamic faith. Local employees also frequently accepted Islam; and in this way the local foreign communities began to include a limited number of local Muslims. In some places, these mixed communities of Muslim traders left the port cities to travel inland in small boats, along the canals of Myanmar and Thailand, and up the river system of modern-day Bangladesh.

Not all foreign Muslims remained in Asia by choice. Bankruptcies, confiscated vessels, shipwrecks, and the changeable policies of local rulers, prevented some merchants and sailors from returning to the Middle East. Thus, in the port cities of the Indian Ocean, at the caravan stops along the overland routes, and along the inland waterways, small communities of local Muslims began to arise. In this early period, the instances of mass conversions of local inhabitants to Islam were few, although there were some notable exceptions, such as in Sund in modern Pakistan, and among the Champa people of Cambodia.

Even though there were no mass conversions of Asian peoples to Islam in this early period, it was an important time in the development of Islam in Asia. By 1300, because of the continuous commercial presence of Muslims along the Silk Routes and in the ports of the Indian Ocean basin, Islam was a "known quantity" in Asia. The Muslim merchants were useful and welcome to both rulers and their people in that the foreign merchants enabled local products to be sold abroad, and distant products to be obtained and enjoyed locally. The economic benefits of their presence were not lost on the local population. The "Arab" merchants, linked by bonds of religion, marriage and language, also provided an "open door" for Asian kingdoms, and often acted as emissaries and agents for local rulers in their dealings with distant realms. By 1300, Islam appeared to many Asian peoples as an attractive religious network that linked many diverse and distant nations in a common international "brotherhood," and enabled people to escape the isolation imposed by their local cults and practices. All that was needed was preachers to invite local populations to join this pan-Asian community.

In 1258, Baghdad, the religious, cultural, and political center of the Islamic world, was conquered and destroyed by the Mongol armies. Although the caliph and his whole family were killed, a distant relative escaped to Cairo and was set up as caliph. However, never again did the caliph wield any real power, and remained a figurehead until Ataturk's suppression of the caliphate in the 1920s. For many Muslims, the existence of a caliph (khalifa, successor of Muhammad), was essential in Islam. Political awareness of Muslims in modern-day India and Pakistan grew sharply as a result of the Khalifa Movement, which sought to restore the caliphate, and resulted eventually in the formation of the World Muslim Congress (the Mu'tamar).

To fill the vacuum created by the destruction in 1258 of the most important political and educational institutions in Islam, new movements arose. The most important were the Sufi Orders. Mystically-inclined Muslims had been present in the Islamic community since its beginnings; but in the 14th Century, they gathered into brotherhoods and became the most dynamic force in Islam. Dedicated to achieving a union of love and will with God, and possessing great missionary zeal, the Sufis began to accompany the merchants on their commercial trips to Asia. Through their preaching, many in Asia were attracted to Islam. The fact that most Asian peoples accepted Islam strongly marked by the mystical, inner-oriented interpretation of the Sufi preachers had important consequences on its subsequent development and history in Asia. In the period 1300-1550, Islam swept through much of South and Southeast Asia, with local rulers and their whole populations converting en masse to the religion.

The early Sufis did not place great emphasis on doctrinal formulation or political questions, but emphasized interior piety and submission to God's will. Instead of a confrontational approach to traditional Asian spirituality, a pantheistic nature religiosity centered on cosmic and interior harmony, the Sufis focused on a few basic principles of Islam—the oneness of God, the necessity of prayer and fasting, and prohibitions against pork and—alcohol and accommodated many traditional practices related to the spirit world and the cult of holy persons and places.

Islam was implanted in Asian societies for a relatively short time, when most predominantly Muslim regions came to be conquered and governed by non-Muslim powers. In South and Southeast Asia it was European Christian powers—first the Portuguese, then Dutch, British, Spaniards, Americans, and Russians—who came to dominate Muslim regions. In the same period, Buddhist Chinese, Thai, and Burmese incorporated Muslim regions into their domains.

During the 17-18th centuries, the early colonial period saw a reformist trend initiated by international Sufi brotherhoods, particularly the Naqshbandiyya and the Qadiriyya, who sought to bring about a deeper Islamic awareness based on better religious education. While not forbidding the traditional rites centered on cemeteries, local shrines of holy persons, healing practices, and the spirit world dwelling in caves, mountains, the sea, and banyan trees, the Sufi reformers worked to instill authentic Islamic practice among Muslims.

When Muslims looked around the world at the beginning of the 19th Century, many asked, "What went wrong?" From having, in previous centuries, the world's most powerful, advanced, and prosperous states in the Ottoman, Safavid and Moghul empires, they had almost everywhere succumbed to the rule of others. A radical response was provided by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab in Arabia, who held that it was because they deviated from the true Islamic path that Muslim peoples arrived at their low state. He felt that nothing less than a return to the pure, original Islam would permit Muslims to achieve their past glory.

Those who took up these views were called Wahhabis. They wanted not only to purify Islam of all accretions and novelties that had wrongly been accepted as Islamic in the course of time, but they held that the Sufi preoccupation with Islam as a personal, spiritual path to God was in itself a distortion of the original intent of the religion. They claimed that Islam was meant to be a program for building a human society whose every aspect was to be lived in accord with the will of God. Islam was not simply, or even primarily, to be seen as a set of pious practices leading to mystical union. Many hajjis making the pilgrimage to Mecca encountered Wahhabi ideas in Arabia and brought these views back with them to their homelands in Asia.

The Wahhabi understanding of Islam had political implications. If God intended the Islamization of society in all its social, economic and political aspects, it was felt that this could only be done if Muslims themselves were in control of the political system. Their political theory held that the state existed to permit Muslims to foster the Islamization process and to forbid and punish wrongdoing. They felt that the Sufis, with their spiritual programs, ignored political realities and held Muslims back from the task of reforming society according to God's will.

The Muslim revival linked religious and political concerns. To pursue their societal ends, they sought to create a state that would favor and implement these goals. The first objective was to achieve liberation from non-Muslim rule. Revivalists began to work actively toward the overthrow of colonial regimes in order to create Islamic states that would support the Islamization of society.

Wahhabi ideas, although they developed in Arabia, spread quickly to Asia. When the Wahhabis, with their political allies of the family of Ibn Saud, conquered the Holy Cities of Mecca and Madina in the early 1800s, Muslim pilgrims on the hajj from all parts of Asia came into contact with the Wahhabi interpretation of Islam and Islamic history. Many of these hajjis returned to their home countries convinced that it was the accommodation of Islam to local Asian cultures that kept Islam weak, and prevented Islam from being what it should: a program for society.

In widely spread parts of Asia, revolutionary Wahhabi views provoked both social reform movements and revolutions against colonial rule. In 1822-23, Sayyid Ahmed of Rae Bareli in northern India performed the hajj. On his return, he launched a short-lived jihad against British influence in India. In 1803, three hajjis returning to Western Sumatra in Indonesia founded the Padri movement, which between 1821 and 1833 carried on an active rebellion against Dutch rule. The Padri rebellion was directed not only against the colonial power, but also against the traditional aristocratic families, and against customs that combined Islamic practice with pre-Islamic traditional law. These are but two examples of a universal phenomenon in Asia in the 19th and early 20th centuries. One could cite as well the cases of Muslim pilgrims returning to southern Thailand and China with revolutionary views. The formation of the Muhammadiyah Movement in Yogyakarta, Central Java, in 1912, is another effect of Muslims returning from the pilgrimage with new ideas after their exposure to Wahhabi views in Arabia.

In the years after World War II, when most Muslim regions achieved independence, two organizations emerged to articulate the concept of the Islamic state. In Egypt and other Arab countries, the Muslim Brotherhood, insisting that rule by Muslims did not ensure the creation of an Islamic state, worked to counter nationalist feelings that in their view divided rather than united the umma. The harsh repression of the Brotherhood in Egypt convinced many that the new Arab regimes were as opposed to the creation of an Islamic state as the colonial regimes had been.

On the Indian subcontinent, the writing and preaching of Abul Ala Maududi resulted in the formation of the Jamiati Islami organization, which held that Islam offered the world an Islamic solution to every modern problem. There was already an Islamic science, economics, politics, legal system, and educational program. Muslims had only to search in their own early tradition to rediscover the ingredients necessary to develop Islamic alternatives to these secular fields. It is interesting to note that Maududi opposed the creation of Pakistan, as he felt that the Muslim people were unprepared to set up an Islamic state.

As one predominately Muslim nation after another achieved independence after 1945, most revivalists hoped that Islamic states would be set up. The actual Muslim rule that replaced the colonial regimes was, however, far from their ideals of the Islamic state. The new ruling class throughout the Muslim world generally adopted the principles of nationalism and created nation states on a European model. Legal codes were based on those of Western nations and were usually mere revisions of colonial law. On the grounds that it was more egalitarian and would prevent the abuses of uncontrolled capitalism, many of the ruling elites adopted socialist policies of a one-party state, state ownership of industries, and centrally-planned economies. Cultural mores, as well as development concepts, were taken from the West.

In the first decades after World War II, many Muslims were enthusiastic about the creation of Pakistan, which they considered a model for the modern Islamic democracy. However, as the years passed, it became clear that Pakistan's Islamic identity did not enable the country to overcome ethnic clashes, economic mismanagement and corruption, military takeovers, and equitable distribution of wealth. Many Muslims claimed that the Pakistan model was a failed experiment, and that a truly Islamic state would have to undergo a more revolutionary societal restructuring.

Shortly after the creation of Pakistan, in 1949, the emergence of the state of Israel had great influence on the thinking of militant Muslims. Seen as a state for European Jews, created in the Arab heartland by the Western powers, to assuage their guilt for Europe's treatment of its Jews, Israel was felt to be a continuation of colonial policies of forced implantation and ruthless land-grabbing. The Palestinian struggle became the symbol of oppressed Muslims striving to achieve, against all odds, liberation through armed rebellion. The Palestinian cause engendered a conviction that the West, despite its professed concern for the development of Muslim nations, was in fact opposed to Islam, and that Muslims were victims of injustice perpetrated by Western powers. The Palestinian people in their struggle for justice symbolized for many Muslims in Asia the oppression and injustice to which Muslims were being subjected in the post-colonial world.

The disastrous defeat of the Arab alliance by Israel in 1967 was a watershed. Egypt, the most populous and powerful Arab nation and its cultural capital, led by the charismatic Gamal abdal-Nasser, with the financial support of other Arab countries, went down to quick and humiliating defeat by tiny Israel. It was not only Nasser and the rhetoric of pan-Arab nationalism that was discredited. The military, on which millions of dollars had been spent, showed itself inept and corrupt. Ineffective in its role of defending the nation, the military was often seen as existing primarily to preserve the internal status quo, enabling the ruling elites to govern by force, often against the will of the people. Hopes that the Western powers would provide necessary assistance were dashed when those states supported Israel, both financially and in international diplomatic fora, such as the United Nations.

Many Muslims began to question the efficacy of nationalist thought and turned to religion to furnish a more effective platform to govern Muslim regions. But as yet, their programs existed only at the theoretical level. Nowhere in the world was there a truly Islamic state which could provide a concrete model for realizing the hopes of the activists. Muslim revivalists were thus primed for the establishment of a polity on Islamic bases. These expectations would be fulfilled by events occurring in a surprising part of the Muslim world.

The 1979 Iranian revolution gave concrete shape to the grievances and hopes of revivalists. The world was amazed when religious solidarity enabled Iranian Muslims to overthrow with apparent ease a wealthy but unpopular Muslim regime, one which had been presumed to be the model of strength and stability. The fact that the Shah's regime strongly promoted secularization in the name of modernization, and was closely allied to the West, was not lost on revivalist Muslims. The Islamic Republic of Iran replaced, in the minds of many, the failed Pakistan model of an Islamic state. All observers, whether sympathetic or not, agreed that the government of Ayatollah Khomeini was truly revolutionary in rethinking and reorganizing every aspect of social life according to Islamic principles.

Later events in the Muslim world encouraged the growth and spread of revivalist ideals. The 1991 Gulf War and the continuing blockade against Iraq, along with economic and diplomatic measures taken against other outspoken Muslim nations, confirmed for many that the West, particularly the U.S.A., intended to isolate Muslim countries, much as communist states had previously been isolated. The massive military presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia, the "Holy Land" of Islam, convinced radical Muslims of the hypocrisy of their traditional rulers. Many accused the leadership of nations, such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Tunisia, of having sold out to international business interests and the realpolitik of American domination.

The electoral victory of the Front Islamique du Salut in Algeria in 1992 showed that a grass-roots Islamic political movement could succeed through democratic processes. The uncritical welcome, granted by Western powers to the establishment of a repressive military dictatorship in Algeria, confirmed to many Muslims the shallowness of European rhetoric about democracy, as well as its implacable enmity towards Islam.

It was in this climate of anger and disillusion that organizations, such as Al-Qa'ida, were formed and exerted an attraction for young activist Muslims. Their primary goal was the overthrow of the autocratic rule of traditional royal families, and of the "managed democracies," such as those of Sadat and Mubarrak in Egypt, or the Suharto and Mahatir regimes in Southeast Asia. Their anger was mainly directed at the U.S.A. policies, both for supporting the aforementioned Muslim "puppet regimes" and the Israeli oppressor, and for the American cultural invasion, which they saw taking place throughout the Islamic world. Some of the revivalists saw no hope for change by means of the political process, and turned instead to revolution and violence.

There are many factors underlying Muslim revival movements in Asia today. There is a criticism of the Sufi roots, and a desire to reorient the inner-directed thrust of Sufism towards an activist program of social reform. Muslim revivalists propose a political philosophy that holds that the state should be an instrument to promote Islamic values and way of life. In many countries, revivalist Islam is an attractive alternative that promises to resolve the crises in existing institutions: the lack of effective and representative government, the wasteful yet ambiguous role of the military, the failure of socialist central planning and management of the economy, and the institutionalization of the traditional ulama which turned them into government servants, rather than being spokespersons for the people.

This is accompanied by a harsh critique of modernity. By modernity is not meant technological advances in communications, transportation and consumer goods. Muslims are ready to accept and use all these to promote their cause. What they object to are the philosophical presuppositions of the modern way of life, its understanding of humankind and its place in the universe, and the values that derive from this philosophy of life.

Muslims see a fundamental conflict of values in today's world. The liberal value system is anthropocentric, with the individual at the center of the universe. This philosophy of life exalts human dignity, freedom and rights. Fulfilling to the utmost one's potential, capabilities and legitimate desires is considered the highest human goal; and modern people must be free to achieve these aspirations. The only limitation on human freedom is that in pursuing one's objectives, the individual must not violate the rights of others to pursue and achieve their own goals.

While liberalism does not deny the existence of God or reject religion, it is skeptical of the ability of any religious system to attain truth, and is opposed to the role of religion in public life. Religion is admissible as the personal choice of some individuals who feel they need to give moral direction to their private and familial lives, but it has no place in public affairs. The marketplace, social interaction and, above all, government, are spheres that must exist and operate outside the influence of religious thought.

Against liberal values, Muslim revivalists propose a theocentric system. For them, God has revealed how humans should live and has laid down the principles on which society is to be built. They feel that Western values lay so much stress on the individual person that the rights of society are ignored or denied. They hold that the humanistic approach to morality espoused by Western modernity leads to dehumanization, where the person is viewed primarily as a consumer of goods, a prospective buyer to be reached by effective advertising, rather than as a creature of God called to live a simple, God-fearing, non-materialist life.

The emphasis on the individual divides the world into winners and losers. The winners are those who obtain the best university education, achieve good, steady jobs, and the privileges that come with wealth and status. The losers are driven to destructive activities, such as crime, or self-destructive activities related to drugs, alcohol, gambling and sexual promiscuity. What people need, critics claim, are not new and better consumer goods, but rather a clear sense that human life finds meaning in the context of an obedient and joyful response to the demands of God.

One of the most important arenas for Christian-Muslim dialogue at the present time is a critical evaluation of modernity to distinguish the obvious benefits that modernization brings to humanity, from the anti-religious, and ultimately destructive attitudes, that often accompany it. In the period after the terrorist attacks of 11 September, the whole question of the use of violence against innocent non-combatants as a tool for change has been reopened. Ethical questions connected with the U.S. government's "war on terrorism," such as the bombing of civilian populations (Afghanistan, and perhaps Iraq), and the proper treatment of prisoners of war, need examination on both sides. These are issues that cannot be avoided in dialogue, if Christians and Muslims are to be able to work together for peace, and the promotion of divine and human values in today's world.

At their first continental meeting, in Manila in 1970, the Catholic bishops of Asia noted three elements of Asian realities that form the societal context in which Christian faith must be lived. They are the undeniable facts: 1) that in Asia they live amidst millions of committed followers of other religions; 2) that they belong to ancient and rich Asian cultures of which they are heirs and stewards; and 3) that they live in societies in which crushing, oppressive poverty is still the daily lot of the majority of people. The mission of the churches in Asia, they proposed, must be the task of dialogue of the Gospel—and thus of the people of the Gospel—with these three realities, that is, the triple task of interreligious dialogue, intercultural dialogue, and dialogue with the poor and marginalized.

In the decades that have passed since this declaration, the triple dialogue has been reiterated and elaborated in many forms by the various Christian Churches. In recent decades, new elements of the international situation have come to the forefront of our consciousness, most notably, the fact that Asian and African societies are part of a globalizing market economy, made possible by the technological and informational revolution, rooted in liberal philosophical values of modernity, and promoting a secularizing process that touches the life of every religious group and culture and every suffering individual. Globalization is a dynamic process that appears to be even stronger than individual nation states and national cultures, and adds a fourth element to the "triple dialogue." This reality challenges Christians to involve themselves in dialogue with the "movers and shakers" of market economies, if more just, humane and harmonious societies are to be built.

My personal involvement in this task of the churches has been in Asia, a region where I was not born but which I consider my home for the past thirty years, in the area of dialogue with Muslims. One thing that I have learned in the course of time is that Muslim-Christian dialogue must never be separated from dialogue with cultures, and, even more importantly, from the centrality of ongoing dialogue with the poor. Interreligious dialogue can too easily become an elitist exercise in which scholars and religious leaders create among themselves a clubby brotherhood across religious lines to perpetuate and, in the worst cases, justify the economic and social status quo. Too often in interrreligious gatherings, the daily concerns of the poor are simply ignored, as if they were non-existent; or mentioned and passed over, as though the indignities and injustices they experience daily were irrelevant, or even an embarrassment, in the context of the lofty religious concepts and ideals expressed. The excluded voices of the poor, of women, of indigenous peoples, and of children, undermine the whole effort of dialogue, and prevent it from becoming an effective means of social transformation.

I am convinced that what is needed today is an interreligious dialogue that begins from the needs and concerns of the poor, and is oriented towards true human liberation. In a world where decisions that affect the lives of millions are made on the bases of market policy, spreadsheets, Realpolitik and demographic projections, religious groups are challenged to provide an alternative reading of social situations, by drawing upon the liberative elements of our specific traditions. It is either in this area where the religious traditions can make a unique and much-needed contribution to the transformation of society, or nowhere. If religious believers fail to voice the genuine longing of the masses of the world's poor for dignity and justice, we simply contribute to the malaise of values that secular modernity inexorably propagates.

In dialogue with Muslims, Christians must not hesitate to draw upon the strong prophetic tradition of our Scriptures, exemplified by Amos, Jeremiah, Isaiah, John the Baptist, and epistle of James; upon the sapiential insights of Job and Qoheleth the Preacher; and most of all, upon the lessons of our Master's sermon on the Mount, his parables of unjust stewards, foolish empire-builders, the rich man in Hell and his impervious brothers, as well as Jesus' observations on poor widows and repentant women; and his example of sharing food with lawbreakers and unwashed masses.

I have rarely heard—and must confess, to my shame, that I have too rarely expressed—such central elements of the Christian tradition in situations of Christian-Muslim dialogue. One wonders why we are more inclined to formulate Jesus' relationship to the Father, of God's Trinitarian life, than to deal with basic Gospel teaching concerning the majority of our neighbors who daily "hunger and thirst for justice," whose demands, our master teaches, will be satisfied. Part of the reason, obviously, is that most of those who engage in formal dialogue are well-fed, well-housed, well-educated, and well-placed in society.

These are the kinds of things that we should be talking about with Muslims, the aspects of our faith that we need to be in communication about. Muslims need to know about the liberating aspects of Christian faith; and it is just as important that we Christians learn about the elements of liberation and transformation that the Muslim poor, who are far more numerous in Asia than Christian, find grounds in their Islamic faith for strength and hope and consolation. We need to discover the strong prophetic tradition carried on in the Qur'an, and the elements of liberation found in the pillars of Islam and in the shari'a, the Islamic way of life.

It is a sign of our ignorance that many Christians respond, "I didn't know that there were liberating elements in Islam. I thought Islam was oppressive of the poor, of women, of sinners. I have the impression that Islam is impassive and fatalistic in the face of injustice and wrongdoing." Yet 30 minutes in any Muslim bookshop will reveal titles such as: Transformative Islam, Islam: the Religion of Justice; and Islam and the Liberation of Women. It is sobering, but small consolation, to remember that Muslims are usually no better informed about our faith than we are about theirs; and are normally surprised to find that Christianity has any concern for human liberation. They often regard Christian faith mainly as a justification for power and wealth.

Christians also need to learn how to listen to Muslims, especially to poor Muslims. They often frame and phrase their hopes and struggles in terms different from ours. Throughout the Islamic world Muslim scholars and activists are rediscovering the liberative elements in the Qur'anic teaching, and in the hadith reports that stem from Muhammad. In the past, Muslim efforts to elucidate the social message of Islam were often hampered by a literalism that made it difficult to apply Qur'anic passages to the very different social and economic structures of today. However, what we find in Asia today, to speak of that region which I know best, in writings of Muslim scholars, like Ali Asghar Engineer of India, Chandra Muzaffar of Malaysia, Muslim Abdurrahman of Indonesia, or the feminist activist Mucha Shim Quiling of the Philippines; and what might be called the co-operative projects of groups, like the Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN); may be properly described as attempts to draw out the societal and economic implications of the Islamic sources, and to implement them in modern Asian societies.

An obstacle that prevents Christians from appreciating and entering into dialogue with Muslims on elements of liberation is the sad fact that all too often Christians and Muslims are locked in confessional conflicts, in which religious affiliation, while not the cause of the conflict, plays an important role in pitting one against the other. This unhappy situation too often leads Christians to see "the Muslim" as a threat to our wellbeing, or even the enemy to be defeated; just as it leads Muslims to regard Christians as inimical to Islam and Muslims. An understandable concern with political Islam, the Islamic state, and the application of the shari'a can blind Christians to the reality that, for the vast majority of ordinary Muslims, Islam is first and foremost a response to God, a way to encounter the Creator, and to do God's will on earth. These Muslims are not interested in politics, or revolution, or communal conflict, precisely because they are far too busy trying to provide for their families, raise their children to be God-fearing people, and eke out a measure of God's abundant gifts, blessings for humankind, but very unequally distributed within the human family. It is with such Muslims that we must enter into dialogue concerning the One God, who is able to liberate people from sin and from the oppressive structures that we have fashioned.

Without pretending to do justice to the transformative exegesis done by Muslims today, I would like to point out some of the Qur'anic passages that are inspiring some Muslims to propose and carry out a liberative agenda in the context of the social realities of modern Asia.

The Qur'anic ideal which has influenced millions of Muslims down through the centuries is that of a simple, family-oriented lifestyle, that rejects both consumer-oriented displays of wealth and the piling up of material possessions. This, even critics of Islam are ready to admit. The Qur'an teaches that what God has given is good and can be enjoyed, but within strict limits of moderation. "Eat and drink," states the Qur'an, "but do not be extravagant. [God] does not love those who go to excess" (7:31, also 6:141). Wealth and property are considered blessings from God, but must be used properly. Those obsessed with seeking, multiplying and displaying wealth are even accused of being in the same family as demons who are not grateful to God for God's gifts. The Qur'an teaches: "Do not squander [your money] extravagantly. Spendthrifts are the devils' brethren and Satan has always been ungrateful to His Lord" (17:26-27). The call to a modest way of life underlies, for example, the prohibition against men's wearing gold ornaments, such as rings, bracelets, chains, and the like.

The Qur'an was first preached to a people who were no less imbued with a dog-eat-dog mentality than our own modern societies. It teaches that aggressive economic activities, and amassing personal wealth, serve to distract people from what is truly important in life: to do God's will in all things, and to stand before God in patience and humility. "Competition has distracted you, until you visit graveyards. Nevertheless, you soon will know" (102:1-3). The message is clear: the day is coming when people will discover, too late, that their desperate passion for wealth had led them astray, and they will have nothing to show for their life's work. Whole civilizations have gone under because of their lack of restraint in regard to material possessions; and all that remains of them are deserted monuments and ruins. As the Qur'an states, "How many civilizations have We wiped out who were reckless in their way of living. Their dwellings have been inhabited only occasionally since then" (28:58).

The Qur'anic ideal of a virtuous life contrasts sharply with that of the "modern advertising ideal" of constantly pursuing fortune, power, beauty, prestige and eternal youth, and restlessly searching for new and exciting pleasures. A famous Qur'an passage sums up what Islamic life is about; it is about faith, generosity, effective concern for the poor, patience in times of distress, and fidelity:

"Virtue does not mean that you turn your faces towards the East or West, but [true] virtue means to believe in God, the Last Day, the angels, the Book and the prophets; and to give one's wealth away out of love for Him to relatives, orphans, the needy, the migrant and beggars; and towards freeing captives; and to keep up prayer and pay the tax for the poor; and those who keep their word whenever they promised anything; and are patient under suffering and hardship and in times of violence. Those are the ones who are loyal, and those are the ones who are heedful [of God's message]" (2: 177).

The concept does not remain simply a good idea; but structures have been created in the religion itself to carry out this injunction. The zakat, the fourth obligatory pillar of Islam, is intended to provide for the poor of the community. Sometimes mistranslated as almsgiving, the zakat is more accurately understood as a poor tax. It is a tax of a specific percentage of a Muslim's income (2.5%) or harvest (10%), and is levied expressly for those classes of society who cannot provide for themselves. In the list of recipients of zakat, the Qur'an always puts in the first place near relatives, particularly one's aged parents; and goes on to list other categories of those whose circumstances put them at the mercy of others: the Biblical orphans and widows, beggars, and migrants. Addressing what has in recent times become a significant class of Asia's suffering poor, the Qur'an commands that assistance is also to be given to "refugees who have been expelled from their homes and property" (59:8).

While zakat is intended to provide for all members of the Muslim community, charity or alms to anyone in need, Muslim or non-Muslim, is highly encouraged in the Qur'an. Such free will offerings, called sadaqa, are to be used "for the poor, the needy, those working at [collecting and distributing it], those whose hearts are being reconciled, for [freeing]captives and debtors, for those [struggling] in God's way, and for the migrant, as a duty imposed by God" (9: 60). The Qur'an knows that charity can too easily be its own reward in that the giver is seen and praised as a person of means who is nevertheless bountiful to the poor. The true charity proposed by the Qur'an should be performed as faithful obedience to what God commands; and as such, it need be seen by no one but God. Thus, in a passage reminiscent of Jesus' teaching in the Sermon on the Mount on giving alms, the Qur'an teaches: "If you give sadaqa (alms) openly, that is good; but if you conceal it and give it [directly] to the poor, that is better for you" (2:271).

Zakat is commanded of every Muslim; and in addition Muslims are urged to perform sadaqa. An example of how sadaqa can be used to supplement zakat can be found in the action taken by the Organization of Islamic Conference (O.I.C.) during the severe drought in the Sahel region of Africa in the 1980s. The O.I.C. used funds collected from zakat payments by Muslims to aid the predominantly Muslim nations affected; and then contributed $1,000,000 in sadaqa or alms to Capo Verde, a mainly Christian nation. More recently, a friend who is an aid worker in El Salvador, said that, after last year's earthquake in that virtually 100% Christian country, the most effective organizations in supplying fast and much needed assistance were the Christian organization Caritas and the Islamic Relief Worldwide. Both were on the job within a week of the earthquake and offered their services to all in need, with no proselytism or other strings attached.

Islamic Relief Worldwide (I.R.W.) operates in some 22 countries, and offers not only disaster relief but development projects of water and sanitation, literacy, business loans, reintegration programs for returning refugees, projects for women's economic empowerment, mother and child care, computer centers, mobile clinics, orphanages, homes for the aged, etc. It is significant that the projects in which I.R.W. is engaged reads very much like a list of projects by various Christian welfare agencies—and, one might add, international Jewish relief agencies. Should it be any cause for wonder that the same prophetic tradition, when its teachings are actually put into practice, would result in very similar approaches to the person in need? Zakat is not intended only as temporary emergency relief for those brought low by personal familial or natural tragedies, but as a type of ongoing income redistribution. The Qur'an explicitly speaks of wealth being extended "to relatives, orphans, the needy and the migrant, so that it will not circulate merely among the wealthy among you" (59:7).

This goal of a periodic redistribution of wealth underlies the intricate Islamic laws of inheritance. The Qur'an states: "Men shall have a portion of whatever parents and near relatives leave, and women shall have a portion of what parents and near relatives leave. No matter now small or how large it be, a portion is stipulated for them. When near relatives, orphans and paupers are present at the division [of inheritance], provide for them from it and treat them politely (4:7-8) ." Repeating the same injunction in the same words underlines the inadmissibility of ignoring female heirs, or cheating them out of their share. Still more surprising is the Qur'anic inclusion of "relatives, orphans and paupers," who also have a right to a portion of the inheritance. These latter are not to be treated as interlopers or unwanted guests, for they have a certain right to be present at the redistribution of funds. No doubt referring to the abuse to which such outsiders are commonly subjected, the Qur'an adds pointedly, "and treat them politely."

Not only are the pillar of zakat and the laws of inheritance oriented to reminding Muslims of their duty to the poor, but celebration of the central Islamic feasts would not be complete without providing for the poor. At Id al-Fitr, the great feast which celebrates the end of the fasting month of Ramadan, Muslims are commanded to pay the zakat al-fitrah, so that the poor of the community can also celebrate the feast properly. At Id al-Adha, the Feast of the Sacrifice, commemorating Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his son, Muslims are commanded to give one-third of the meat of the sacrificed animals to the poor.

The underlying view of wealth presumed by such Qur'anic teaching is that a person's wealth is not simply a private fortune to dispose of in any way one wants. God has a say in the matter and wants to ensure that the person's spouse, children, relatives, as well as helpless and dependent sectors of society, receive their proper share. Thus, along with the wealth that one has received from God goes a responsibility to provide for others, beginning with one's closest family ties and extending all the way to those whose claim is based solely on common humanity.

Wealth and inequalities in economic status are seen in the Qur'an as a test of one's fidelity to God. The Qur'an states: "He is the One who has placed you as overlords on earth and raised some of you higher than others in rank so that He may test you by means of what He has given you" (6:165). And again, "God has favored some of you more than others in providing [for them]. Yet those who have been allowed to excel are not willing to hand over their provision to those under their control so that they become equal partners in it Do they not thus abuse God's favor?" (16.71, see also 64:15, 8:28). In the God-centered universe envisioned by the Qur'an, the fact that some are wealthy, while many are poor, is not simply an accident of history, nor the inevitable result of economic determinism or class struggle, but a means by which believers are tested in their fidelity to God's word, in their generosity, sense of responsibility for the neighbor, and humility in recognizing that all that they possess comes from God's bounty.

The Qur'an saves some of its harshest warnings for those who are selfish and egotistic in using what they have been granted. "Announce painful torment for those who hoard gold and silver and do not spend them for God's sake" (9:34). And, "How terrible it will be for everyone who backbites and slanders, and for him who amasses wealth and keeps on counting it. He reckons that his wealth will make him immortal, but he will be flung into [Hell]" (104:1-4).

The Qur'anic warnings do not stop with personal selfishness, but extend as well to those who fail in their responsibilities to teach generosity and social concern. "God does not love someone who is conceited and boastful, nor those who are tight-fisted and encourage others to be stingy" (4:36-37). One of the strongest condemnations in the whole Qur'an is directed at the person who refuses to believe God's message and fails to teach the necessity of taking care of the poor. "Take him off and handcuff him. Padlock him to a long chain. Then let him roast in Hell. He neither believed in God almighty, nor encouraged others to feed the needy" (69:30-37).

The message is clear and uncompromising: God is deadly serious about the importance of "feeding the needy," with all that is implied in that obligation; and about the importance of encouraging others to do likewise; and God will not treat lightly those who neglect this duty. We must not allow the hyperbolic language (reminiscent of some of the prophet Amos' more stringent warnings, or of Jesus' injunction to pluck out your eye or cut off your hand, if they cause you to sin) to distract us from the passage's unequivocal message. Failure to integrate what we today call "social concern" into personal and communal religiosity is placed right alongside the refusal to believe in God. Both those who promote an unbridled consumerism, as well as theologians and other teachers of religion, might do well to hear this warning and tremble!

Given the force of the Qur'anic strictures against an unrestricted use of wealth, and the obligation to "give away a part of it" (2:177), it should come as no surprise that a disproportionate number of Muhammad's early followers were women, slaves, and people without means, while his main opponents were the prosperous merchants of Mecca, whose financial comfort was connected with the city's role as a flourishing pilgrimage site of the pagan religion.

The Qur'an, however, sees Muhammad's rejection by the wealthy classes of Mecca as indicative of a more general unwillingness to accept the prophetic message on the part of those overly attached to material possessions, those whose security is based on what they "have," rather than what they "are" before God. The Qur'an states: "Whenever we sent a warner to civilizations, the wealthy elite said: "We do not believe in what you have been sent with!" They say, 'We have more wealth and children [than you]; we will not be tormented'" (34:34-35).

The Christian scholar from Sri Lanka, Aloysius Pieris, has called Jesus "God's defense pact with the poor." In Christ, he sees God displaying, to use the modern phrase, "a preferential option for the poor," and a promise to defend them from the arrogant and unjust use of power on the part of the rich. I agree with this view, but feel that it could be extended to cover the major thrust of the whole prophetic tradition since the time of Abraham and Sarah.

The Qur'anic attitude to an economic system in which "the big fish eat the little fish" is twofold. On the one hand, there are strict warnings against "devouring the wealth of others" through exploitation and manipulation. On the other hand, there are strong expressions of God's commitment to defend the defenseless against those who would take advantage of their vulnerability. One passage displays a knowing awareness that economic aggressiveness and official corruption often go hand in hand and reveal the same Godless mentality. "Do not devour one another's wealth to no good purpose," states the Qur'an, "nor try to bribe authorities with it, so that you can aggressively consume a share of other people's wealth, even while you realize [what you are doing]" (2:188).

Economic competition, where the only rule is that of profits and annual returns, is strongly condemned. What is foreseen, instead, in an Islamic way of life, is economic activity in which both partners freely consent, and which is mutually beneficial. "You who believe, do not use up one another's wealth to no good purpose, unless it is for some business based on mutual consent among you" (4:29). The idea that in business affairs, one takes whatever one can get, is not the way that those who obey God's word must deal with one another.

Profiting from the needs and weaknesses of others underlies the Qur'an prohibition of interest-taking. Debts that cannot be repaid should be postponed, or better yet, written off, rather than imposing unbearable burdens on debtors. The Qur'an states: "Listen to God and write off anything that remains outstanding from lending at interest if you are [true] believers. If you do not do so, then be prepared to face war declared by God and His Messenger. If any debtor suffers hardship, then postpone [repaying] it, until conditions become easier [for the debtor]. And if you treat it as an act of charity, it will be better for you" (2:278-280, cf. also 2:275). In today's world where crushing international debts are causing untold suffering for millions in poor countries, I need not elaborate the relevance of this teaching.

The second side of the Qur'an teaching is the promise of God's punishment of those who exploit the weak and defenseless. Here again, the Qur'an is repeating the consistent prophetic tradition. From early prophets like Nathan confronting David, and Elijah condemning Ahab and Jezebel, through the writings of the Hebrew prophets, and into the teaching of John the Baptist and Jesus, the prophetic word has consistently taken "widows, orphans and strangers" as paradigmatic of all those groups in society who are at the mercy of others. The widows and orphans must rely on the strength of God's word to protect them from injustice, exploitation and oppression. The widows and orphans in Asia today include indentured laborers, factory workers, street children, sex-industry workers, child laborers, tenant farmers, dalit sweepers, and fishing folk.

The Qur'an reiterates the prophetic word by calling for a change of heart in people, urging them to join the defenders, rather than the oppressors, of the weak. The Qur'an focuses particular attention on the plight of orphans. Many commentators have pointed out that this concern might well reflect some of the misery and indignities to which Muhammad had been subject as an orphan (cf. 93:4-5). If revelation is granted in the context of a prophet's own life experience, this could well be the case. What is clear is the strong Qur'anic condemnation of those who would exploit the orphan and the needy. "Those who live off orphans' property unjustly will only suck up fire into their bellies, and they will roast in the Blaze" (4:10).

There are too many passages in the Qur'an on this theme to cite them all, and any reader of the Qur'an will find justice to the orphan to be a motif that runs throughout the Sacred Book. For example, "The orphan must not be exploited; and the beggar should not be brushed aside" (93:9, cf. also 6:152, 4:36, 59:7, 4:5-6, 4:8, 2:215, 90:13-14). One might go so far as to say that, according to the Qur'an, a key indication of whether one is accepting or refusing the divine message is the way one treats the orphan and the pauper. The Qur'an states: "Have you seen someone who rejects religion? That is the person who pushes the orphan aside and does not encourage feeding the needy" (103:1-3).

Similar to the orphans is the unfortunate child whose parents are more interested in material comfort than in the divine gift and responsibility that are children. In passages that are often cited to oppose the practice of abortion, the Qur'an states: "Do not kill your children out of fear of poverty. We will provide for them and for you. Killing them is a serious sin" (17:31; see also 6:151, 6:140). A poignant passage notes that, on the Last Day, the baby girl who has been destroyed because she would be an economic burden "will be asked for what offence she had been killed" (81:8-9). The shameful practice of selling one's children, particularly young girls, into prostitution, which is so prevalent in certain regions of modern Asia, was apparently also quite common at the time of Muhammad. The Qur'an categorically condemns this practice: "Do not force girls, if they want to preserve their chastity, into prostitution, so that you may seek worldly benefits" (24:23).

Other social concerns which the Qur'anic teaching raises for Muslims include: dishonesty in business practice ("It will go badly for cheats who insist on full measure when they have people measure something out for them, yet whenever they measure or weigh things for others, they give less than what is due" (83:1-3); manipulation of markets and the use of power to obtain unjust advantages ("You use your oaths in order to snatch at advantages over one another, just because one nation may be more prosperous than another" 16:92); partiality and favoritism in judicial systems ("Whenever you judge between people, you should judge on [the principles of] justice" 4:58); racism and ethnic chauvinism ("You who believe, do not let one group of people sneer at another set; perhaps those others are better than they are. Women should not ridicule other women; perhaps those others are even better than they are themselves. Nor should you debase yourselves by insulting one another and calling names. It is bad to use evil names [about others] after [entering] the faith" 49:11-12).

I conclude this introductory study with a few words on the duty of those who believe in God to work for peace and reconciliation. The Qur'an allows the Old Testament principle of "an eye for a tooth for a tooth as a limit of strict justice, that is, one cannot require compensation greater than the crime (i.e., never demand two eyes for an eye or two teeth for one); but at the same time, the Qur'an encourages believers to go beyond strict justice and operate instead on principles of mercy and forgiveness... to move beyond a legalistic mentality of demanding strict justice, to a God-centered spirituality in which people are invited and urged to treat others as God treats us. Here I call your attention to several passages of the Qur'an that point in this direction:

The reactions are similar when I teach Christian theology to Muslims. My Muslim students repeatedly say that they have no quarrel with the teachings of Jesus or with the way he lived, or what he preached. He is, after all, considered "the Seal of Holiness" by Muslims. but they regret that this is not what they see when they look at the behavior of Christians around the world. Gandhi's famous phrase: "Christianity is a beautiful thing; it's just never been tried" is a challenging accusation, although it does not express the whole of Christian reality and history.

The sad reality is that both Christians and Muslims are constantly struggling to live in obedience to the prophetic message we have received. We are constantly failing, constantly being called back to repentance (Bible: metanoia, Qur'an: tawba) and God's forgiveness, constantly standing in need of God's grace which alone can transform our personal and communitarian lives. Moreover, we must not overdraw the picture. I could point to countless examples of Muslims and Christians who concretely seek to care for the poor, to support their just causes, to oppose dehumanizing and unjust systems of economy and government, and to work for true human liberation. There are millions of Muslims and millions of Christians around the world who are striving, often together, to put into practice the message contained in the prophetic word.

But is this not exactly what Christians and Muslims ought to be talking about together our magnificent ideals and our all-too-often sad realities; our sincere efforts as well as our shameful failures; our wonderful experiences of God's love and our selfish refusal to share that love with others? I suggest that this is what dialogue is all about. I conclude with a verse from the Qur'an: "If God had wanted, He could have made you one community. So compete with one another in doing good deeds, so that He may test you by what he has given you" (5:48).

Final Message

The Conference of European Churches (KEK) and the Council of European Bishops' Conferences (CCEE) invited Christians and Muslims involved in interreligious encounters to meet in Sarajevo, a city which is highly symbolic of religious and cultural exchanges. In the present new multiethnic and multireligious stage in the history of Europe, Muslims and Christians from 26 countries spent three days sharing their concerns in three specific areas:

• the challenges of living together in a largely secular and plural society;
• healing the wounds of Christian and Muslim memories so that we can commit ourselves to justice and peace for all;
• shared values through which our communities can contribute actively to constructing a better society.

Together, we wish to contribute to a dynamic identity of our continent, and we advocate a religious attitude which will:

• lead us to take courageous actions in favor of human life, freedom, religion, property, dignity and justice;
• give to us and to our faith communities a clear awareness of our common humanity making us brothers and sisters beyond our different religious and social commitments;
• refuse the justification of violence in the name of religion.

Our commitment to dialogue leads us to make the following recommendations:

• to bring up young people to know and to respect each other's faith and community through educational programs, and to promote religious education in public schools with interreligious courses;
• to support interreligious groups at grassroots level among lay people, with a view to becoming aware of all trends which go against co-operation;
• to encourage priests, pastors, theologians, imams and Islamic leaders and laypeople, to undertake dialogue and interreligious encounter through exchanges between Christian and Muslim faculties and seminaries;
• to maintain or establish in each European country institutions with the aim of interreligious dialogue to serve ethical, social and political values in our societies;
• to continue our efforts in developing an awareness of our common values.

1. At the invitation of the Council of European Bishops' Conferences (CCEE) and the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue (PCID) a group of bishops, theologians and specialists in interreligious dialogue convened at the Domus Aurea, Magliana, Rome, to reflect on Buddhism in Europe. Those participating brought with them various experiences of Buddhism and Buddhist—Christian relations in more than a dozen European countries, from Spain to Russia and from Sweden to Italy. The meeting was held from May 19th-22nd 1999, some months prior to the meeting of the Synod on Europe; and was the first ever meeting on this topic jointly organized by CCEE and PCID.
2. The first task of the participants was to review the situation of Buddhist-Christian relations in their respective countries. At the present moment the Buddhist presence in Europe covers a wide spectrum—from longer-established groups, to more recent immigrant communities and asylum seekers. But the main concern expressed by the group relates to the growing number of baptized European Christians who are attracted by Buddhist ideas and practice. This phenomenon is quite different from that of the presence of Islamic communities, with their clear sense of identity and affirmation of faith in a personal Creator God. It is also distinct from those who find themselves joining a wide variety of New Religious Movements. For many people in Europe today Buddhism represents an ancient tradition of spiritual wisdom, which constitutes an alternative to their original religious upbringing and cultural background.
3. The group began its reflections on this new situation by drawing attention to the way the Church recognizes with respect and affirms the truths and values in a tradition which offers coherent answers to the "enigmas of human existence" (Nostra Aetate, 1). In particular, as Vatican II acknowledges, "Buddhism in its various forms testifies to the essential inadequacy of this changing world" (Nostra Aetate, 2). The Church sees in Buddhism a serious path towards radical conversion of the human heart. From the Church's own concern to be awake to the Lord's presence, she cannot but be respectful of a tradition which draws attention to the salvific potential of the "here and now." The practice of mindfulness creates a sense of a wider silence which nourishes the attitude of compassion. This often overflows into commitment and action. These and other Buddhist practices also encourage those "fruits of the spirit"—inner peace, joy, equanimity, etc., —which accompany an intense spiritual discipline.
4. Many such aspects of Buddhism make it a tradition which finds a ready response in persons seeking for a spiritual meaning in life. Thus, they are impressed by Buddhist teaching of the interconnectedness of all created reality and all "sentient beings." This sometimes results in a strong impetus towards an ecological awareness. However, adherence to a Buddhist world-view raises serious theological and pastoral issues for the Church. Theologically, the dialogue with Buddhists raises questions about all the central themes of Christian theology, especially about the nature of the Creator and the single mystery of creation and salvation. Pastorally, the dialogue asks how the Church is to respond to those "post-Christians" who have embraced a very different way of conceiving that mystery.
5. In faithfulness to the Christian revelation of the God who welcomes all people, the Church is first and foremost called to offer hospitality to Buddhists. This needs to take place at a number of different levels—engaging in the "fourfold dialogue" of theological exchanges, religious experience, daily life and common action (Dialogue and Proclamation, 42). For Catholics to be hospitable to Buddhists means, in the first place, recognizing that the Church is a community which is itself formed by the loving dialogue of God with humankind; and is called, therefore, to live out this dialogue in its relationship with all people as partners in a common pilgrimage.
6. At this critical moment in the transformation of European society at the end of the millennium (Redemptoris Missio, 38; Tertio Millennio Adveniente, 52-53), this hospitality implies a renewal of the Church's evangelical responsibility towards all those who, for whatever reason, find themselves seeking for spiritual enlightenment outside the visible bounds of the Church. In this quest they claim to be searching for an alternative to what they frequently experience as a sterile dogmatism. They often feel the Church to be overly institutionalized, relying upon out-dated and incomprehensible language. Many complain of missing an adequate initiation into personal prayer, meditation, and the experience of integral salvation.
7. This evangelical responsibility has various dimensions. On the one hand, the Church, out of her pastoral care for those who have chosen to live out this search, continues to propose Jesus Christ as the Way, the Truth and the Life (John 14.6), and the Church as a living community of faith which accompanies them in his Spirit (Lumen Gentium, 13). On the other, the Church seeks to engage in dialogue and by a renewal of the ancient tradition of the "discernment of spirit" to invite them to be faithful to themselves and to what the Spirit is teaching (Redemptoris Missio, 56). Such a discernment cautions against an easy eclecticism and calls attention to the problems which attend the phenomenon of a double belonging which would minimize the significance of religious difference.
8. As pastoral priorities, it is recommended that attention be given to the provision of adequate resources for formation, for information and for co-ordination.

1. Formation

Pastoral centers with responsibility for catechesis should take into account the needs arising from the growing presence of "new" Buddhists in Europe. The range of activities of these centers implies the need for specialists, and the formation of people competent to identify principles of spiritual and theological discernment, and to exercise a diakonia veritatis (Fides et Ratio, 49-50) on behalf of the Church.

2. Information

Ways need to be found to bring together adequate resources and reliable materials for education at both school and adult levels; for celebration of interfaith encounters between Buddhists and Christians; and for various sensitive pastoral issues, such as the spiritual accompaniment of inter-faith marriages, hospital and prison chaplaincies, etc.

3. Coordination

It seems important that each Bishops' Conference should appoint a person who can co-ordinate the emerging demands of this ministry of inter-religious hospitality. Such a person would be responsible for representing individual bishops and/or the Bishops' Conference to established Buddhist groups in the country and for liaison with other centers — particularly monastic communities, academic institutions and inter-faith organizations. Wherever possible, this ministry should be given an appropriate ecumenical dimension.

NOTES

Published October 2002
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FABC Papers:

90. Emerging Demands of Mission of the Church at the Turn of the Century; the Church as a Servant of Hope for the Peoples of Asia, by Soosai Arokiasamy. A Position Paper for the Seventh Plenary Assembly of the Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences, 2000.

91. The Renewal That Awaits the Church in Asia, by Luis Antonio G. Tagle. A Position Paper for the Seventh Plenary Assembly of the Federation of Asian Bishops' Conferences, 2000.

92. Seventh Plenary Assembly: Workshop Discussion Guides

a. Church and Social Communication in Asia, by the FABC Office of Social Communication.
b. The Witness of Consecrated Life in Asia Today, by Sr. Julma C. Neo.
c. A Renewed Church in Asia: In Solidarity with Women, by Virginia Saldanha.
d. Formation for Priesthood in Asia, by Vicente Cajilig.
e. Continuing Formation for Priesthood in Asia, by Vicente Cajilig.
f. A Renewed Church in Asia. A Mission of Love and Service to Migrant Workers and Refugees in the Third Millennium, by Jigger S. Latoza.
g. A Renewed Mission of Love and Service to the Indigenous/Tribal Peoples of Asia, by Sebastian Karotemprel.
h. The Charismatic Movements and Small Church Communities, by Antonio B. de los Reyes.
i. Gospel-Based Communities Becoming Agents of Change, by Cora Mateo.
j. Lay Ministries in the Renewed Church of Asia, by Thomas Vijay.
k. Interreligious Dialogue in Pursuit of Fulness of Life in Asia, by Edmund Chia.
l. A Church in Universal Harmony and Solidarity through Justice and Peace, by Anthony Rogers.
m. The Call to a Renewed Church in Asia and the Challenges of Religious Fundamentalism, by John Locke.
n. Opening Paths to Life through Education, by Lourdes J. Custodio.
o. The Church in Mission ad Gentes, by Saturnino Dias.
p. Human Values and the Pursuit of a Full Humanity in Asia, by John Mansford Prior.
q. The Asian Image of Jesus: Theological, Biblical, Catechetical and Liturgical Renewal, by Jacob Theckanath.
r. Christian Duty of Advocacy for Transformation of Society, by R. J. Rajkumar.
s. A New Ecumenical Vision for the New Millennium, by Thomas Michel.
t. The Role of Working Professionals in Building a Just World, by Anselmo Lee.
u. Springtime of Holiness: A Continuing Call to Spirituality in Asia, by Arturo M. Bastes.

*                                *                                *

Additional Workshops:
72     f. Young Adults in a Renewed Church, with Jun Hashimoto and Aloysius Tan.
        g. A Mission of Love to the Family, with Sister Catherine Bernard Haliburn.

*                                *                                *

93. A Renewed Church in Asia: A Mission of Love and Service. The Final Statement of the Seventh Plenary Assembly of the Federation of Asian Bishops, 2000.
94. Pope John Paul II, Ecclesia in Asia. The Church in Asia. The Post-Synodal Apostolic Exhortation, 1999.
95. A Renewed Church in Asia: Pastoral Directions for a New Decade, a Pastoral Report of the FABC Seventh Plenary Assembly, 2000.
96. Methodology: Asian Christian Theology. Doing Theology in Asia Today. A Document of the Office of Theological Concerns of the Federation of Asian Bishops’ Conferences, 2000.
97. Participation of the Roman Catholic Church in National Councils of Churches, by Thomas Michel, S.J., and by J.M.R. Tillard, O.P., 2001.
98. The Church in Asia in the 3rd Millennium, A Guidebook to the Apostolic Exhortation-The Church in Asia, Ecclesia in Asia. A Pastoral Study Prepared by the FABC Office of Human Development, 2001.
99. Asian Movement for Christian Unity III (AMCU), Giving Shape to a New Ecumenical Vision, A Joint CCA-FABC Project, 2001.
100. An Index of FABC Papers, 1976-2001, edited by James Kroeger, M.M., 2001.
101. Church and Social Communication: The Asian Synod --FABC Challenges. A Project of the FABC Office of Social Communication, 2001
102. Towards a Culture of Peace in the 21st Century, Our Responses as Christians to Social Advocacy. A Joint Project CCA -- FABC -- ASPYMCA, 2002.
103. Christians and Muslims In Dialogue, by Thomas Michel, S.J., 2002.

 

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